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I.  Introduction.
  In many countries, banks are controlled by persons or entities with substantial interests in non-
financial firms.  Quite often, a significant fraction of bank lending is directed towards these related parties,
which include shareholders of the bank, their associates and family, and the firms they control.  Proponents
of related lending argue that close ties between banks and borrowers may be efficient.  For example,
Lamoreaux (1994, page 79) writes of post-Revolution New England that  “...given the generally poor quality
of information, the monitoring of insiders by insiders may actually have been less risky than extending credit
to outsiders.”  Critics of related lending claim worry that it diverts resources from depositors or minority
shareholders.
The view that close ties between banks and borrowers are valuable is related to Gerschenkron’s
(1962) analysis of long-term bank lending in Germany, to the optimistic assessments of bank lending inside
the keiretsu groups in Japan (Aoki, Patrick and Sheard 1994, and Hoshi, Kashyap, Scharfstein 1991), and to
theoretical work on credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981).  Related lending may improve credit efficiency
in several ways.  Bankers know more about related borrowers than unrelated ones because they are
represented on the borrower’s Board of directors and share in the day-to-day management of the borrower.
They may be able to use such information to assess the ex-ante risk characteristics of investment projects or
to force borrowers to abandon bad investment projects early (Rajan 1992).  In addition, both hold-up
problems and incentives for pursuing policies that benefit one class of investors at the expense of others may
be reduced when banks and firms own equity in each other.  Thus, related lending may be better for both the
borrower and the lender because more information is shared and incentives are improved.  We call this
optimistic assessment of related lending the information view.
The alternative view is that close ties between banks and borrowers may allow insiders to divert
resources from depositors and/or minority shareholders to themselves.  This view  is related to the idea of
looting (Akerlof and Romer 1993) and tunneling (Johnson et al. 2000) as well as the revisionist view of the
benefits of keiretsu groups in Japan (Morck and Nakamura 1999, Kang and Stulz 1997).  Looting can take
several forms.  If the banking system is protected by deposit insurance, the controllers of a bank can take
excessive risk or make loans to their own companies on non-market terms, fully recognizing that the
government bears the costs of such diversion.  Even without deposit insurance, the controllers of a bank have
a strong incentive to divert funds to companies they control, as long as their share of profits in their own
companies is greater than their share in bank profits.  The basic implication is that related lending is very
attractive to the borrower, but may bankrupt the lender.  We call this pessimistic assessment of related lending
the looting view.
We study related lending in Mexico using a newly assembled database of individual loans.  In1 This structure is partially the result of the privatization policies implemented during the last two decades (see
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and  Shleifer, 2002).  The ownership of banks by non-financial firms is unrestricted in 38
countries (including Austria, Germany, Switzerland, and the UK, as well as  Bolivia, Brazil, Indonesia, Russia, and
Turkey).  The ownership of banks by non-financial firms is prohibited in only four countries (British Virgin Islands,
China, Guernsey, and Maldives).  See Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001). 
2 Three general sources on the links between banks and non-financial firms in Latin America and Asia are:
AmericaEconomia (Annual Edition, 1995-1996, pages 116-128), Backman (1999) and Lindgren et al. (1996).  Country-
specific sources include: Edwards and Edwards (1991) for Chile, Revista Dinero (http://www.dinero.com /old/ pydmar97
/portada/top/topmenu.htm) for Colombia, Standard & Poor’s (Sovereign Ratings Service, November 2000, page 9) for
Ecuador, African Business (May 1999) for Kenya, Garcia-Herrero (1997) for Paraguay, Koike (1993) and The Economist
(8/5/2000, pages 70-71) for Philippines, Nagel (1999) and Laeven (2001) for Russia, The Financial Mail (12/6/1996)
for South Africa, Euromoney (Dec 1997) for Thailand, and Verbrugge and Yantac (1999) for Turkey.  Finally, Beim and
Calomiris (2001) discuss the importance of related lending in financial crises.
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Mexico, banks are typically controlled by stockholders who also own or control non-financial firms. This is
in direct contrast to previous studies of ownership structures in Germany and Japan where banks exert control
over “group” firms but not vice-versa.  Nevertheless, the Mexican banking structure is common in many
developing countries.
1  Banks that are controlled by persons or entities with substantial non-financial interests
are prominent in Bangladesh, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Estonia, Guatemala, Hong
Kong, Indonesia, Kazakstan, Kenya, Korea, Latvia, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Russia, South Africa,
Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela.
2  Faccio et al. (2000) report that the ultimate controlling
shareholder of 60% of the publicly-traded firms in Asia also controls a bank.  Even in Europe, this figure is
as high as 28%.  In fact, the Mexican banking setup is similar not only to that of many developing countries,
but can also be seen in the early stages of development in England, Japan, and the US (Cameron 1967, Patrick
1967, and Lamoreaux 1994).  
Using all banks in Mexico, we first examine the identity of each bank’s top 300 borrowers by total
loan size.  We find  that 20% of loans outstanding at the end of 1995 were to related parties.  Banks sharply
increased the level of related lending when they are in financial distress.  For each bank, we then collect
information on the borrowing terms of a random sample of 90 loans from the top 300 loans outstanding at
the end of 1995.  The results show that related parties borrow at lower rates and are less likely to post
collateral.  We then track the performance of the loans in this random sample through December of 1999 to
evaluate their default and recovery rates.   After controlling for borrower and loan characteristics, related
borrowers are 33%-35%  more likely to default than unrelated ones.  We also find that the default rate on
loans made to related persons and to privately-held companies related to the bank is 77.4%.  The equivalent
rate for unrelated parties is 32.1%.  Moreover, recovery rates are $0.30 per dollar lower for related borrowers
than for unrelated ones. 
Overall, the results are consistent with the looting view and challenge the information view.  The
sheer magnitude of the gap in default rates between related and unrelated loans makes it difficult to argue that3 Akerlof and Romer (1993) is one notable exception. Their model is deterministic: looting takes place when
the value of the bank’s capital falls below a threshold.  Instead, we emphasize the option-like nature of default as insiders
may default on their bank loans at the cost of foregoing their equity in the bank.
4 Consistent with this assumption , the auditor commissioned by the Mexican congress found  that some related
loans “...were granted without any appropriate reference to the capacity of the debtors to repay” and that loan officers
had accepted “...collateral from the borrower that they knew was false or of no value to the bank” (Mackey 1999).
5 Default is not tightly linked to bankruptcy in Mexico.  In our sample, 14 related party borrowers who defaulted
were publicly-traded firms, and it is easy to follow them in the post-1995 period.  Only one publicly-traded industrial
firm went bankrupt (Fiasa).  Courts finally sanctioned Fiasa’s bankruptcy because it did not have a known address, which
suggests that creditors may have faced similar difficulties locating the firm’s assets  (“El Economista,” 9/11/2000).
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it is optimal to lend to related parties on better terms than to unrelated ones.  Furthermore, to the extent that
we can measure it, related borrowers emerge from the crisis relatively unscathed – bank owners lose control
over their banks but not their industrial assets.  Despite these facts, our results may be consistent with some
versions of the information view.
The paper proceeds as follows.  In Section II, we present the hypotheses and develop a simple model
of looting. Section III presents the sample and basic empirical methodology.   Section IV describes the
incentives for related lending in Mexico and documents its prevalence.   Section V contrasts the lending terms
of related and unrelated loans and studies their performance in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 1994.
Section VI concludes. 
II.  A Simple Model of Looting and Alternative Hypotheses.
The banking literature stresses the incentives for excessive risk-taking when banks are financially
distressed.  Here we draw attention to other forms of looting that have received considerably less attention.
3
Specifically, we focus on the incentives for insiders to divert cash for their own benefit.  Our key assumption
is that insiders structure self-dealing transactions to minimize recovery on related-party loans when these
default.
4 Specifically, we assume that related parties can avoid repaying their loans at the cost of foregoing
their equity in the bank.
5  As a result, related parties repay their bank loans when the value of their equity in
the bank is high but default otherwise.
We assume that each bank is controlled by a single shareholder who owns a fraction  of the cash-
flows of the bank and a larger fraction  (>) of the cash flows of an industrial firm (i.e., the “related party”)
which she also controls.  We also assume that the controlling shareholder has effective control over lending
decisions.  She can direct the bank to lend to related parties on non-market terms but needs to engage in costly
transactions to avoid repayment in the bad state.  As a result, when a controlling shareholder directs the bank
to lend L to a related party, the controlling party only receives (L) and L- (L) is wasted (Burkart, Gromb,
and Panunzi 1998, Johnson et al. 2000, La Porta et al. 2002).  We assume L>0 and LL<0.6 Deposit insurance creates further incentives to engage in related lending. Without deposit insurance, the extent
of related lending is limited by the need to allow outside financiers to break-even on their investment.  Because deposit
insurance pays for the loses of depositors in the bad state, the level of related lending that is compatible with outside
investors recouping their investment is even higher. 
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( ) αβ ** ( ) * * * REDr D R L +− ≥ (1)  
( ) αγ β ** ( ) * * * * EDL R Lr D R L +−+ − < (2)   
[] [ ] DqrD q EDL =+ − + − ** ( ) ** ( ) 1 γ (3)   
The model has two periods.  In the first, a fraction of the assets of the bank must be financed by
deposits (D) and the rest by shareholders’ equity (E).  Investors are risk-neutral and there is no deposit
insurance.
6  For simplicity, we assume that the risk-free rate is zero while the promised (gross) interest on
deposits is r.  In the first period, the bank lends L to the related party and E+D-L to unrelated parties.  Both
borrowers promise to pay R per dollar borrowed.  Loans are due in the second period and time ends.  The
world may be in either a “good” or “bad” in the second period, with probabilities q and (1-q), respectively.
In the good state, loans are repaid in full.  In the bad state, the bank recovers a fraction  (<R) per dollar of
unrelated loans.  In contrast, the bank recovers nothing when related loans default.  In expectation, loans are
unprofitable when made to related parties (RR= q*R<1) and profitable when made to unrelated ones  (RU=
q*R+(1-q)* >1).  Finally, to make our results interesting, we assume that the bank goes bankrupt if insiders
default (*(E+D-L)<r*D).
We consider the equilibrium in which the insider does not default in the good state (otherwise, outside
shareholders cannot break even).  In the good state, the insider willingly pays back when her liability to the
bank (*R*L) is less than the profits that accrue to her if she pays her loan, i.e., when: 
Consider next the bad state. The insider defaults when her liability to the bank exceeds the profits
that would accrue to her if she paid her loan, i.e., when:
Whenever >, the insider always defaults.  This occurs because repayments on unrelated loans are
insufficient to reimburse depositors in the bad state.  As a result, banks are very fragile: related parties
optimally default on their loans from the bank precisely when outside borrowers are in financial distress.
Depositors are indifferent between investing in the riskless asset or in the bank.  They are paid in full
in the good state and receive the value of the bank’s equity in the bad state.  As a result, the value of deposits
D is given by: 
The insider receives profits from her equity holdings and from looting.  In the good state, the insider
receives her pro-rata share of the profits of the bank (=*(R*(E+D)-r*D)) but loses money on looting since-6- 6
( ) [] [] Eq R E D r D L R L q L ( ) * * *( ) * *( ( ) * ) ( )* * ( ) πα β φ β φ =+ − + − + − 1 (4)   
[] [ ] E R E D LRL D LRL UR R () * * ( ) * * () * πα β φ =+ − + − + − (5)   
βφ α β ** ( ) * LU RR RR R =− + (6)   
she must pay her share of the interest bill on the loan (=*R*L) .  In the bad state, the insider foregoes her
equity in the bank but captures *(L) in profits from looting.   Accordingly, the expected profits of the
insider are given by:
Using equation (3) in equation (4), the expected profits of the insider can be rewritten as follows:  
where RU (=q*R+(1-q)*) and RR (=q*R) denote the expected rates of return on loans to unrelated and related
parties, respectively.  The first term represents the insider’s pro-rata share in the expected profits of the bank.
The second term captures the “private benefits” that the insider does not share with other shareholders.  We
have so far assumed that the insider controls a single related party.  A straightforward generalization of (5)
to the case when the insider controls multiple related parties predicts that the insider will direct the bank to
offer better borrowing terms to high- entities than to low- ones.  Better borrowing terms for high- entities
may include lower interest rates and collateral requirements than for low- entities.
The insider picks the level of related lending to maximize her expected profits.  The first order
condition for this problem can be written as: 
This says that at the margin, the cost from engaging in related lending must exactly equal its benefit.
Consider shifting $1 in loans from unrelated parties to related ones.  The insider is a shareholder in the related
party and receives *L when a dollar is diverted from the bank.  On the other hand, as a shareholder in the
bank, the insider bears a fraction  of the reduction in profits resulting from the change (RU-RR). At the same
time, the insider pays RR per borrowed dollar as a shareholder in the related party.  According to equation [6],
related lending is restrained by a high equity stake of the insider in the bank and by attractive opportunities
to lend to outsiders.  Related lending increases with the insider’s equity stake in the related party () and
when borrowing terms on related loans are attractive.  
In our empirical work, we focus on five questions.  First, what is the extent of related lending? 
Second, do banks lend to related parties at different and possibly more favorable terms?  Third, which related
parties get the most beneficial terms?  Fourth, how do related- and unrelated loans perform in the “bad” state
of the world?  Fifth, when does related lending increase?  
Equations (5) and (6) are helpful to answer these questions for Mexico.  Before the crisis, Mexican
banks were among the most profitable banks in the world (i.e., RU was likely high).  In contrast, it is likely7 The information view is also consistent with related parties borrowing on less advantageous terms than
unrelated ones (for example, low-quality debtors may be monitored by banks while high-quality debtors borrow against
collateral).  The opposite is true in our date and, thus, we focus on related lending that takes place on beneficial terms.
8 In fact, related borrowers may (inefficiently) take too few risks.  For example, critics of German banks argue
that banks veto worthwhile investment projects because, as creditors, they do not internalize the benefits that accrue to
shareholders when risky projects are successful (Wenger and Kaserer, 1998). 
9 One way to motivate the awful state of the world is to argue that related borrowers are negatively affected by
the loss of banking relationships (perhaps because relationship banks have specialized human capital that other banks
cannot easily substitute). Both Bernanke (1983) and Diamond and Rajan (2000) emphasize the losses that result from
severing the ties between bankers and their related borrowers during financial crises.
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that the return on unrelated loans was low because the bad state occurs with certain regularity in Mexico.
Moreover, poor protection of creditors allows related parties to default with relative impunity in the bad state.
According to (6), this implies that the level of related lending should be high in Mexico.  Moreover, the
looting view predicts that related parties borrow at below-market terms and that high- entities should receive
the most beneficial borrowing terms.  As a result, loans to related parties (and, in particular, to high- entities)
should perform very poorly in the bad state because such loans are backed by collateral of very dubious
quality, if any.  Low levels of collateral contribute to the bad performance of related loans by increasing the
insider’s incentive to default and by lowering the bank’s recovery rate when default does occur.  Finally,
equation (6) predicts that related lending increases when the bad state becomes more likely. 
Evidence on the size and terms of related lending is insufficient to distinguish among the looting and
information views.  Most plausible versions of the information view predict that related lending should be
large in Mexico as it mitigates moral hazard and asymmetric information problems, both likely to be high in
Mexico (La Porta et al. 1997 and 1998).  The information view is also consistent with lending at advantageous
terms to related parties as banks minimize costs by lending to borrowers they know well and/or to firms
whose investment policies they control and pass some of these efficiency gains to borrowers.
7   
Different versions of the information view make opposing predictions regarding the performance of
related-party loans during a severe recession.  A standard version of the information view holds that
advantageous lending terms for related parties are justified by low expected default rates and high expected
recovery rates.  In this view, related lending facilitates the optimal allocation of capital by removing
informational barriers to selecting good projects and/or empowering banks to curtail excessive risk-taking
by borrowers.  In sum, related lending improves loan performance.
8  It is possible, however, to construct
versions of the information view that make the opposite prediction regarding the performance of related party
loans in a downturn.  For example, a model could include three states (good, bad, and awful) and not just two.
In the good state of the world, both related and unrelated loans pay as promised.  In contrast, unrelated loans
default more often than related ones in the bad state of the world.  Finally, in the awful state of the world,
related parties default more often than unrelated ones.
9  If the awful state of the world is infrequent enough,10  We checked the accuracy of the reported classification of related and unrelated borrowers using a list of all
the officers and directors of all banks, publicly-traded firms (and their subsidiaries), and the top-500 firms (and their
subsidiaries) in 1995.  With rare exceptions, all the borrowers with links to the banks as officers and directors had been
appropriately classified as “related” by our primary sources.  In addition, we examined whether unrelated loans are
reclassified as related ones six months after a forced change in control.  The implicit assumption is that most knowable
cases of fraud and misreporting are likely, by that period, to be identified by the new management of the bank.  We found
very few mistakes (2 to 3 per bank) in the initial classification of a debtor as related or unrelated.  In contrast, it is rather
common that performing loans be reclassified as non-performing.
11 Our definition of related party leaves out two potentially important modes of self-dealing.  First, associates
of Bank X may have systematically borrowed from Bank Y whereas associates of Bank Y may have systematically
borrowed from Bank X.  In fact, audits of some of the bankrupt banks revealed that related lending sometimes took
exactly that form.  As a robustness check, we have expanded the definition of related lending to include borrowers
associated with other banks (8 borrowers).  The results are qualitatively similar and we do not report them on the text.
Second, some bankers may have avoided related-lending regulations by lending to firms controlled by front men
(Mackey, 1999).  Unfortunately, we have no way of addressing outright fraud in our database.  Fraud, however, biases
the results against our findings.
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it may be fair to grant beneficial terms (e.g., low interest rates and collateral requirements) to related parties.
 Note, that an implication of the three-state-information view is that loans made in the awful state break-even.
In contrast, the looting view predicts that such loans lose money on average.
III.  Data and Methodology.
A.  Data
This paper is based on a new database describing the terms and performance of a sample of loans
made by 17 Mexican banks circa 1995.  We are interested in comparing the terms offered to related and
unrelated borrowers as well as the ex-post performance of those loans. Our sample includes all but two banks
that existed when privatization was concluded in 1992. The two missing banks (Bancrecer and Banoro) are
under state administration at the time of writing and feared that disclosing information on  related lending
might undermine efforts to sell them.  Three new banks entered the market in 1994 and are not in our sample
as they may not have had sufficient time to reach “steady-state”.  Our sample represents 93% of the assets
of the banking system at the end of 1994.  
Banks were required to submit to the banking supervisor a list of the 300 hundred largest loans
together with their size and the names of each of the borrowers.  Starting in December of 1995, banks were
also required to disclose the affiliation of these debtors, which allows us to classify borrowers as related and
unrelated ones.  We follow standard legal practice and define related debtors as those who are: (1)
shareholders, directors or officers of the bank; (2) family members of shareholders, directors or officers of
the bank; (3) firms where the previous two categories of individuals are officers or directors; or (4) firms
where the bank itself owns shares.
10, 11
We use the list of the three hundred largest loans from each bank in our sample for two very different12 Section III presents time-series statistics on the evolution of the proportion of the largest 300 loans that were
given to related parties.  For the period before December of 1995, we manually classified loans as related or unrelated
using secondary sources.
13 In some cases banks did not have 45 related loans among the largest 300 loans and we had to settle for less.
Those cases are: Banpais (40), Cremi (38), and Citibank which did not have any related loans. 
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purposes: to get a snapshot of the aggregate magnitude of related and unrelated lending in Mexico, and to
select a random sample of  loans for further analysis of their terms and ex-post performance.
12   For each
bank, we draw a random sample of approximately 90 different borrowers from the 300 largest loans in
December 1995 or, when unavailable, in March of 1996.  We collect data on the terms of each of the loans
in the random sample.  In addition, we follow their evolution through time until December of 1999 as they
are repaid, renewed, and restructured.  Note that our sample may be biased towards the “cleaner” forms of
self-dealing as it is drawn from loans that were routinely scrutinized by regulators.
Whenever possible, we sample 45 related and 45 unrelated loans for each bank.
13  The National
Banking and Securities Commission sent an official request to gather information on the loans in our random
sample. Although the information was supplied by the banks, the credit files were made available to the
regulator to verify their accuracy.  Each bank was required to extract and supply the following information:
(1) characteristics of the debtor (assets, total liabilities, liabilities with the bank, sales, and profits); (2)
characteristics of the credit (interest rates, maturity, collateral, and guarantees); (3) performance of the credit
(date of default, percentage recovered, terms of any renewals, restructures and/or loan forgiveness); (4)
amount of the yearly payments made by the borrower between 1993 and 1999; and (5) analogous information
about other credits that the debtor had, or obtained within four years of the date of the loan, with the same
bank.
The total number of loans in the sample is over 1,500.  Some borrowers had more than one loan
outstanding with the same bank.  In such cases, we report the weighted average of the terms (e.g., interest
rates) of all loans by the same borrower and compute total promised payments and total actual payments by
borrower.
An important characteristic of our sample is that banks  were in varying degrees of financial distress
at the time we took the snapshot of their loan portfolio.   The first bank failures (Cremi, Union, and Oriente)
took place in the second half of 1994 and the last one (Serfin) in 1999 (see the first column in Table I).  At
the onset of the financial crisis, the government took over financially distressed banks with the goal of
restructuring them and finding a buyer for them in better times.  The government took over three banks in
this fashion in 1994 (Cremi, Union, and Oriente).  Three years later, the government sold the branches of
those three banks but retained most of their (non-performing) loans.  Later, the government focused on
finding buyers for the failing banks (11 banks) and skipped the restructuring process.  As a result, the related14  We include bank-fixed effects in the regressions to capture the fact that banks faced different incentives to
loot.  We also include in the regressions a dummy for whether the bank is under government or private management.
15 For data availability reasons, we are only able to follow loans through December of 1999.
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party that made the loan in our random sample is typically not the agent that tries to recover from a non-
performing borrower.  We believe this is an advantage as related parties may have procrastinated before
pulling the plug on loans to their associates. 
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B.  Methodology.
In this sub-section, we discuss how we compute interest rates and recovery rates.  We introduce the
remaining variables as we discuss them in the text (see the appendix for definitions of the variables).  Loans
vary on the date on which they were granted and on their maturity.  This complicates direct comparisons
across loans since interest rates were highly volatile over the sample period.  To partially address this
difficulty, we report realized real interest rates over the maturity of the loan.  To illustrate, consider a loan
that, in period t, pays a spread of s over the reference rate i and has a maturity of T months.
15, 
16  Letting the
inflation rate be , we compute the average real rate for this loan as follows:
In addition to real interest rates, we also compute the average difference between the interest rate paid
by the loan and the “risk-free” rate as measured by the one-month rate on government bonds.  Continuing
with the previous example and letting r
f be the currency- and maturity-matched rate on government bonds
(i.e., depending on the currency of the loan, the US or Mexican government bond rate), our measure of spread
over government rates is computed as follows:
We keep floating and fixed interest rates separate as they present different risk characteristics.  For
the same reason, we also keep domestic and foreign interest rates separate and deflate using the Mexican or
US wholesale price index as appropriate.  As a result, we group loans in four categories: (1) domestic/fixed;
(2) domestic/floating; (3) dollar/fixed; and (4) dollar/floating.
One of the goals of the paper is to assess the number of loans that paid less than initially contracted
(“bad loans”).  To examine the performance of the loans in our random sample, we track them from the17 At least some of that did take place.  “Interest accruing on these loans [referring to loan to directors] was
frequently capitalized rather than paid.  In some cases, additional loans were issued to borrowers for the purpose of
paying interest on the initial loans.” (Mackey, 1999, page 216).
18  Twenty nine of the loans in our random sample were sold to FOBAPROA although they were not technically
in default. On average, FOBAPROA paid 88.7% of the face value of the loans but has recovered only 15-20% of their
face value so far.  Because banks had incentives to sell to FOBAPROA those loans with the worst repayment
expectations, we classify all loans sold to FOBAPROA as bad loans even if they had not technically defaulted at the time
when they were transferred to the government.  We compute recovery rates for loans transferred to the government in
the same manner as for all other loans in the sample.  Specifically, we ignore payments from FOBAPROA and keep track
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formation period (i.e., December of 1995 or, when not available, March of 1996) through 1999 as they are
either: (1) paid at maturity; (2) paid in advance; (3) renewed; (4) restructured; (5) transferred to FOBAPROA;
(6) settled in court; or (7) in default and not yet settled.  We aggregate all these outcomes into a single
performance measure (“recovery ratio”) by keeping track of the net cash-flows paid to the bank by the
borrower after the loan enters the sample. Keeping track of loan performance over time is important as
problems with related loans may take time to show up if banks renew related loans without paying attention
to their credit quality or restructure loans without assessing the repayment ability of the borrower.
17 
Our calculations are designed to avoid these problems.  Specifically, we define the recovery ratio as
follows:
where: paymentt includes coupon and amortization payments received, amounts recovered in court, and
collateral repossessed; renewt is the face value of loan renewals; it is the contracted interest rate; capital0 is
the face value of the loan when it was first made; and T is the maturity of the loan extended, if necessary, by
renewals, restructurings, or court awards.
Identifying bad loans involves some judgment calls.  The most obvious bad loans are those that
defaulted.  For regulatory purposes, loans were classified in default after 90 days of missing a payment, or
in the case of a one-payment loan, after 30 days of missing the payment. Forced restructurings of performing
loans are more difficult to capture.  Most loans were typically restructured because the borrower was
financially distressed.  However, it is possible that some loans were restructured at no loss to the bank.  We
err on the conservative side by classifying restructured loans as bad loans only when the bank simultaneously
takes an accounting loss.  Thus, our proxy for bad loans underestimates the true level of noncompliance by
not capturing, for example, a bank that grants additional time without interest to pay back a debt.
1819 See La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999) for a general account of privatization in Mexico.  
20 The number of non-financial firms with publicly-traded equity at the time of privatization is too small to
compute the value of control for those firms. 
21 Higher percentages were possible with the authorization of the Ministry of Finance.
22 In February of 1995, restrictions on related lending were changed.  The new rules allowed banks to lend to
related parties up to their net capital.
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IV.  Facts About Related Lending in Mexico.
A.  Banking in Mexico.
Many of the ownership and control features of the banks in our sample can be traced back to
privatization that returned commercial banks to the private sector by 1992, ten years after all commercial
banks had been nationalized.
19  Privatization took place gradually through the placement of minority stakes
in the stock market in 1987.  By 1992, government ownership of commercial banks was fully eliminated.
In privatization, control of banks was auctioned off to the highest cash bidder.  However, important
ownership restrictions were put in place at the time to prevent banks from becoming controlled by either non-
financial corporations or by foreigners (Lopez-de-Silanes 1997).  Specifically, at least 51% of the votes of
a bank had to be held by a Mexican group, and control over banks by corporations was ruled out.  Instead,
banks had to be controlled by a dispersed group of individuals.  Each of the members of the controlling group
could own up to 5% of the equity of a bank without question, or up to 10% with the express consent of the
Ministry of Finance.  Foreign entities could own up to 30% of a bank’s equity in low-voting shares under
similar ownership-dispersion requirements as those that applied to individuals.
These ownership restrictions, coupled with the low-level of development of financial markets,
severely limited competition in the privatization auctions by restricting potential bidders to domestic investors
with cash to bid.  Nevertheless, the average (median) control premium paid for banks at the time of their
privatization was 51.8% (50.0%) (López-de-Silanes and Zamarripa 1995).
20  These data are consistent with
the view that controlling shareholders of banks perceived private benefits of control to be high.
  Just as corporations were not allowed to control banks, banks were not allowed to own more than 5%
of the capital of non-financial corporations.
21  Beyond these ownership restrictions, few rules addressed
potential conflicts of interest.  Related loans could not exceed 20% of a banks’ loan portfolio and no special
approval was required on loans to related parties as long as each loan was smaller than 0.2% and 1% of the
bank’s net capital for loans to individuals and firms, respectively.
22  When those limits where exceeded, loans
to related parties had to be approved by a majority of the members of the Board of Directors.  No rules limited
the participation of interested directors in such decisions.  
Key to the interpretation of the results in the paper is that, in practice, ownership dispersion
requirements and rules separating banks and industrial firms were insufficient to avoid potential conflicts of23 Officers and directors of Vitro (including Adrián Sada González) owned 23.2% of the capital and 38.64%
of the votes in Vitro.
24  The only bank in our sample that is clearly different from Serfin is Citibank.  From a regulatory standpoint
there was no difference between Citibank Mexico and domestic banks.  However, Citibank operated in Mexico as a
wholly-owned subsidiary of the US parent and most large loans made by Citibank’s Mexican subsidiary had to be
approved by US headquarters. 
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interest.  To illustrate this point, consider the case of Banco Serfin (the third largest bank) which is
representative of the other banks in the sample.  Adrián Sada González was the Chairman of the Board and
owned 8% of the capital and 10.1% of the votes in Serfin.  Although his stake in Serfin met the letter of the
law regarding ownership dispersion requirements, it seriously underestimates Sada-González’s control over
the Board of Serfin.  Other directors and officers of the bank owned 33.6% of the capital and 42.7% of the
votes in Serfin.  Two sons of Adrián Sada González sat on the Board and eleven of the forty-four members
of the Board of Serfin were related to each other by blood or marriage.   Because reporting requirements do
not allow us to know the identity of those directors and officers, we cannot pin down the fraction of the votes
effectively controlled by Adrián Sada González but it clear that he exercised effective control over Serfin.
Serfin had close ties with many of the largest corporations in Mexico.  Adrián Sada González was
also the largest shareholder and Chairman of the Board of Vitro—a publicly-traded maker of glass products.
23
In fact, the Board of Serfin included the controlling shareholders of fourteen other publicly-traded firms.  To
put this figure in perspective, only 185 firms were publicly traded in 1995.  Furthermore, many of the
publicly-traded firms controlled by Serfin’s directors and officers were among its largest borrowers.  For
example, 8 of the top twenty loans to firms in the private sector were given to publicly-traded firms controlled
by members of Serfin’s board.  Another 3 of the largest 20 private-sector loans went to privately-held firms
owned by Serfin’s directors and officers.  Finally, the son of a member of the Board was among the top 20
private sector borrowers.  All in all, related parties obtained 12 of the largest 20 loans made to the private
sector.  The example of Serfin suggests that the separation between the control of industrial and financial
firms may have been more apparent than real.  It also suggests that the agency problems in Mexican
banking were different from those in, for example, Japan where both banks and industrial firms are typically
widely-held and run by professional managers.
24    
Lending policies were also shaped by other features of the banking regulation.  At the time of
privatization, Mexico created a deposit insurance system (“FOBAPROA”) similar to the FDIC in the US.
FOBAPROA guaranteed all deposits equally, regardless of the creditworthiness of the bank.  At the same
time, minimum capitalization requirements were independent of the riskiness of a bank’s loan portfolio.
Banks were allowed to set interest rates and to allocate credit freely. Bank supervision was lax partly because
regulators were overwhelmed by the rapid growth of credit that followed privatization and partly because25  The level of related lending by survivor banks between December of 1994 and December of 2000 is fairly
stable at around 13% and the choice of event period for survivor banks does not qualitatively affect the results. 
26  The level of related lending in bankrupt banks peaks at the time of the change in control and drops quickly
afterwards (which suggests that concealment of related lending is not a very important problem in the sample of large
loans). 
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prudential regulation was inappropriate (Gil-Díaz and Carstens 1997, López-de-Silanes and Zamarripa 1995).
In summary,  banks were acquired by local families that already controlled industrial groups and had
the financial resources required to bid in the privatization auction.  Furthermore, during the sample period,
related lending was largely unregulated and poorly supervised while banks operated under a generous deposit
insurance system.  We turn next to measuring the extent of related lending.      
B.  The Size of Related Lending.
Table I presents basic data on related lending for each of the banks in the sample.  We group banks
into two categories.  The first group of thirteen banks (“bankrupt banks”) includes those that were either taken
over by the government or acquired by other banks to avoid a government takeover.  The remaining five
banks (“survivor banks”) did not experience changes in control during the sample period. Although some of
the members of the group of survivor banks experienced considerable financial distress during the sample
period, we separate both groups of banks since they may have faced different incentives. We are particularly
interested in the level of related lending when bankrupt banks change control (the event period) since
incentives for self-dealing increase as the value of the bank’s equity falls.  For comparison purposes,  we
define September of 1997 as the event period for survivor banks (roughly, the median date of change in
control for bankrupt banks).
25  We present snapshots of the percentage of the top-300 loans made to related
parties at three points in time: (1) December of 1993 (i.e., before the devaluation), (2) one-year before the
event period, and (3) during the event period.
Table I shows that the mean (median) bank in the sample had 13% (14%) of the top-300 outstanding
loans with related parties in 1993.   Related lending in 1993 is moderately higher for bankrupt banks than for
survivor banks (14% versus 10%, respectively, for both the means and medians).  The difference in the
fraction of loans to related parties for bankrupt and survivor banks increases sharply as bankruptcy looms
closer.  Consistent with the looting view, the mean (median) fraction of related lending increases by 13 (13)
percentage points for bankrupt banks between December 1993 and the event period.  Furthermore, most of
this increase in related lending by bankrupt banks is concentrated in the year preceding the event period when
the mean (median) fraction of related lending jumps by 12 (10) percentage points.
26  In contrast, the mean
(median) fraction of related lending increases by 3 (7) percentage points for survivor banks between
December 1993 and the event period.   In sum, related lending by bankrupt and survivor banks is comparable27  Furthermore, Section V presents evidence that loans made by bankrupt banks after the big devaluation were
also highly unprofitable. 
28 As an alternative measure of the size of the shock to a bank’s capital, we examined the ratio of accumulated
losses in the two years that precede the bank’s bankruptcy to the level of capital at the beginning of that period.  The
results are qualitatively similar to those reported in the paper.  
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in 1993 but markedly diverges as banks plunge into financial distress. 
Observable differences in corporate governance (e.g., ownership structures, board composition, etc)
do not explain the increase in related lending.  Recall that all banks (except Citicorp) have similar corporate
governance structures and are publicly-traded entities controlled by a small number of individuals.  Similarly,
all banks were privatized in the same manner.  One version of the three-state information view that may
explain the increase in the fraction of related loans is that such borrowers required additional loans in the
post-devaluation period to keep attractive projects viable.  Contrary to these predictions, related lending by
survivor banks in the six months that follow the devaluation is roughly constant at 13% (not reported).
27  In
the looting view, increases in related lending are tied to reductions in the profitability of loans to unrelated
parties and in the value of insiders’ equity in the bank.  As a crude proxy for the shock that hit banks, we
compute the change in non-performing unrelated loans between December of 1993 and the bankruptcy date
as a fraction of the bank’s capital in December of 1993.
28  The correlation between this variable and the
change in related lending in the same period is 0.63.  This result is consistent with the looting view although
the number of observations (14) is too small to achieve statistical significance.
     To assess the economic significance of the looting view, Table I compares the volume of related
lending relative to the price that bidders paid to gain control of the banks.  The results show that the mean
(median) bidder obtained $1.50 ($0.72) in (top-300) loans for each dollar that she paid at the privatization
auction.  These figures likely underestimate the magnitude of related lending if the controllers of banks were
able to camouflage some self-dealing transactions.  
Finally, Table I also reports the fraction of non-performing loans made to the private sector.  We
compute non-performing loans based on the loans to the private sector in the sample of top-300 loans for each
bank six months after the event period.   We examine non-performing loans six months after bankrupt banks
experience a change in control as auditors are, by that time, typically able to identify most of the inappropriate
practices followed by the previous management .  At the same time, six months is probably not long enough
for new management to turn around the bank, alter its lending policies, and deal aggressively with non-
performing loans.  Naturally, non-performing loans are significantly higher for distressed banks than for
healthier ones (32% versus 10%).  More interestingly, consistent with the predictions of the looting view, the
correlation between non-performing loans and related lending is very high (0.815).  However, mor micro-
level data is needed to examine this issue in detail and we postpone such analysis until Section V.-16- 16
To review the results thus far, consistent with both views of related lending, banks make large loans
to related parties.  Banks appear to step up the intensity of related lending as a forced change in control looms
closer.  Related loans are strongly correlated with the fraction of non-performing loans.  Although the last
two findings require further examination, which we undertake in the next three sections, they are consistent
with the looting view and difficult to reconcile with the information view. 
V.  Lending Terms and Ex-post Performance.
A. Lending Terms.
The information view maintains that related borrowers may obtain preferential terms (e.g., lower
interest rates) because they are easier to screen and monitor.  Under the looting view, better terms for related
borrowers reflect self-dealing by bank insiders. Table II describes the borrowing terms for related and
unrelated borrowers with the following five categories of variables: (1) interest rates; (2) collateral; (3)
guarantees; (4) original maturity; and (5) grace period.  The results in this section, and in the remainder of
the paper, are based on this random sample of loans.  
Panel A in Table II shows the results for real interest rates.  Interest rates on related loans are
consistently lower for related parties than for unrelated ones.  Flexible rate loans in domestic currency, are
the most frequent type of loan in our sample.  The mean (median) real interest rate on these loans is 9.56%
(9.87%) for unrelated loans but only 6.75% (7.36%) for related ones and the mean (median) spread over
government bonds is 6.54% (7.00%) for unrelated loans but only 3.44% (4.00%) for related ones.  The other
categories of loans show a similar pattern. 
Panel C reports the incidence of collateral and guarantees as well as their value as a fraction of the
loan’s principal at the time it was granted.  Although related parties borrow at lower rates, their loans are less
likely to be backed by collateral.  Whereas 84% of the unrelated loans are collateralized with assets, only 53%
of related loans are backed by collateral.  Furthermore, the mean (median) collateral-to-face-value ratio is
1.19 (0.52) for loans to related parties compared with 2.89 (1.84) for loans to unrelated parties (differences
in means and medians are both significant at 1%).  Parallel results hold for the frequency of guarantees (see
Panel D).  Related loans are less likely to have personal guarantees (47.7% versus 66.3%).  The evidence on
interest rates and collateral requirements is consistent with the looting view, but can be reconciled with the
information view if, for example, related parties are high-quality borrowers.
Panel E shows that unrelated loans have slightly shorter maturities than related ones (although the
difference is not statistically significant).  The mean (median) maturity is 45.6 (36) months for unrelated loans
and 48.7 (36) months for related ones.  Similarly, unrelated parties have shorter grace periods than related
ones (7.4 months shorter for means and 6 months shorter for medians) before banks have the right to pull the29  In this section, we report results based on pooling corporate and non-corporate borrowers.  To check the
robustness of the results, we rerun all regressions using the sub-sample of corporate borrowers and including the log of
sales as a measure of size, the debt-to-asset ratio as a proxy for financial risk, and the income-to-sales ratio as a measure
of profitability.  The results are qualitatively similar and we do not report them.
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plug on them (Panel F).  One interpretation of these findings is that banks shorten the maturity of loans to
unrelated parties to facilitate monitoring and gain bargaining power over low-quality borrowers. The
alternative interpretation is that banks are soft on related parties.
Since differences in the ex-ante financial risk characteristics of the two types of borrowers may
account for the observed divergence in borrowing terms, we examine whether our results on borrowing terms
survive in regressions that control for size, profitability, and leverage. The independent variables include
fixed-year and bank effects and dummies for fixed-rate and foreign currency loans. The dependent variables
are: (1) real interest rates; (2) interest rate spread over the risk-free rate; (3) a dummy that takes a value equal
to 1 if the loan has collateral; (4) the collateral-to-face-value ratio; (5) the guarantee-to-face-value ratio; (6)
the maturity period; and (7) the grace period. 
Table III presents the results.
29   In the regressions using real interest rates as the dependent variable,
size and leverage have the expected signs, but only size is significant.  Fixed-rate loans and domestic-
currency loans pay lower real rates (probably because of the surprise devaluation of 1994 and the inflation
that ensued).  The key finding  in the interest-rate regression is that related loans pay 4.15 percentage points
less than unrelated ones, and this difference is significant at the one per cent level.   Results using interest rate
spreads as the dependent variable are very similar and imply that related loans pay 5.15 percentage points less
than unrelated ones (also significant at the one percent level).
The results on collateral are also interesting.  Large firms post collateral less frequently and, when
they do, in smaller amounts.  Similarly, highly leveraged firms post larger amounts of collateral.  Related
loans are 30% less likely to have collateral and the predicted collateral-to-loan ratio is roughly 2.9 units lower
for related than unrelated parties. To put this figure in perspective, note that the mean collateral-to-loan ratio
is 2.14 with a standard deviation of 3.38.  The results on guarantees, maturity, and grace period also confirm
our findings on Table II: loans to related parties are less likely to be backed by personal guarantees, have
longer maturities, and longer grace periods than loans to unrelated parties.
To summarize, related parties borrow at lower interest rates and longer maturities than unrelated ones.
They also post less collateral against their loans and offer fewer personal guarantees than unrelated creditors.
The preferential treatment received by related parties does not appear to be tied to differences in size,
profitability, or leverage.  These results are consistent with the view that related lending is a manifestation
of self-dealing.  An alternative interpretation is that related loans are safer than arm’s length ones in ways that
are not picked up by our controls.  We compare these two interpretations in the next section.30 One possible concern is that defaults may be more likely for loans that mature in 1995 and that related loans
may disproportionately do so.  The opposite is true.  Loans that mature in 1995 are more likely to be unrelated than
related ones (58.5% versus 41.5%). 
31 We present evidence against this view in Section V.
-18- 18
B.  Ex-post performance.
The devaluation in December of 1994 started a severe and prolonged downturn in the Mexican
economy, during which many borrowers defaulted on their bank loans.  In this section, we compare the
default and recovery rates of related and unrelated loans in our sample.  Under the simple version of the
information view, related parties borrow on beneficial terms because screening and monitoring reduce their
default rates and enhance their recovery rates.  In contrast, the looting view predicts that related lending takes
place on advantageous terms although related borrowers have higher default rates and lower recovery rates
than unrelated ones.  Similarly, the three-state information view also predicts that unrelated loans perform
better than related ones in a severe financial crisis.  
Panel A in Table IV shows the incidence of bad loans in our sample.  Consistent with both the looting
and three-state information views, the default rate is 37% for unrelated borrowers and 66% for related ones
(the difference is statistically significant at 1%).  The number of performing loans restructured with
forgiveness (“other bad loans”) is very small.  As a result, the fraction of all bad loans is 39% for unrelated
borrowers and 70% for related ones.
30  One can interpret these findings in two ways.  One interpretation is
that related borrowers were hit disproportionately hard by the crisis.
31  A more cynical interpretation is that
related borrowers found it easier to default.  Recall that related loans are less likely to be collateralized,
raising the incentive to default.  In addition, as pointed out by the FOBAPROA officer in charge of recovering
bad loans, “...proper procedure was not followed when [related] loans were granted, they lacked some of the
required legal documentation, collateral was not duly registered in the Public Register of Property, there was
no follow up of how borrowed funds were used or of how loans performed...” (Jornada 8/2/99).  Plenty of
anecdotal evidence is consistent with this view including loans backed by buildings that were never built or
by planes that could not fly.
Panel A also shows the collection procedures followed by banks. One may wonder how aggressive
were collection efforts, particularly when the government took over banks.  Collection efforts were fairly
aggressive as most bad loans were sent to court (461 loans out of 807).  Only 13.3% of bad loans to unrelated
parties and 12.4% of bad loans to related parties were restructured but not sent to court. Finally, a few loans
(3-4%) were sold to FOBAPROA.
Panel B of Table IV presents data on the recovery rate of bad loans.  As predicted by both the looting-19- 19
and three-state information views, the mean (median) recovery rate for bad loans was 46.2% (44.8%) for
unrelated borrowers and 27.2% (15.0%) for related ones (the differences are statistically significant at 1%).
Some of the large differences in recovery rates may stem from the fact that, unrelated credits are backed by
more collateral than related ones.  But even when the loan is not backed by collateral, collection is
substantially higher for unrelated parties.  The mean (median) recovery rate for an uncollateralized unrelated
bad loan is 42.1% (43%), while a similar related loan yields only 25.8% (10%). We obtain similar results if
we compare the recovery rates of bad loans backed by less collateral than the median loan in the sample.
Finally, the last section of Panel B shows recovery rates for all loans.  We shift the focus of the
analysis from bad loans to all loans to aggregate the effects of default rates and recovery rates into a single
number.  Related loans are doubly hit:  higher default probabilities and lower recovery rates in default than
unrelated ones.  As result, the mean (median) gap in the recovery rate of all loans widens to 30% (60%) from
19% (30%) for all bad loans.  The recovery rate for the median related loan in our sample is a paltry 40%.
For robustness, we check whether our results survive in regressions that control for size, profitability,
and leverage, as well as bank, year-of-loan and industry effects.  Table V shows that borrowers that are
bigger, more profitable, and less leveraged when the loan was made are less likely to default and have higher
recovery rates when they do. Controlling for everything else, related borrowers are 33-35% more likely to
default (depending on whether we use all the sample or only corporate borrowers).  The results on recovery
rates also show an economically large effect of related lending: the recovery rate drops by 0.28 for a bad loan
made to a related borrower, and by 0.70-0.78 for all related loans.  The related dummy is significant at 1%
in all regressions.  In sum, all the univariate results survive in the regressions.
The above results fit well with the looting view of related lending as they show that, controlling for
observable measures of risk, related parties borrow on advantageous terms. . However, these results also fit
the three-state information view.  Whereas there can be little disagreement that 1995 was a very bad year it
is less clear that, the devaluation of that year was a rare event.  In fact, the country experienced six
devaluations during the period 1970-95 of 20% or more in real terms (in 1976, 1982, 1985, 1986, 1994, and
1995).  Note also that for the three-state information view to explain why banks step up their lending to
related parties as the crisis sets (Table I), it is necessary to further assume that related parties, although unable
to repay their pre-crisis loans, enjoyed attractive investment opportunities going forward.  To examine the
nature of the investment opportunities available to related parties in the post-1994 period, we distinguish
between “old” and “new” borrowers depending on whether the first loan to a borrower was made before or
after December of 1994, respectively.  The pre-1994 loans should, ceteris paribus, perform significantly
worse than the post-1994 ones as the devaluation that took place in 1994 adversely impacted credit quality.
In fact, default rates for loans made before and after December of 1994 are not statistically different (78.9%-20- 20
versus 74.5%, respectively) and neither are recovery rates (39.8% versus 38.4%, respectively).  The next
section further suggests that the three-state model would need additional refinements to fit the data.  
C.  Further Results.
A straightforward prediction of the looting view is that the returns that the bank earns on related loans
should be lowest for loans to parties in which the insider has a large equity stake.   Data on ownership is
simply not available except for rare exceptions (e.g., companies with ADRs in the US).  As a proxy for
ownership, we use a dummy that takes a  value equal to 1 if the borrower is a publicly-traded firm and 0
otherwise.  We test the prediction of the looting view that related-privately-held firms borrow on very
attractive terms despite a high frequency of default and low recovery rate. In contrast, a plausible version of
the information view would hold that banks will charge higher interest rates on loans to closely-held firms
than to publicly-traded ones because the former are more opaque.
Table VI shows the results of regressions that explain the borrowing terms and the performance of
the loans using the same control variables of the previous regressions but adding the interaction term between
related party and publicly-traded firm.  Publicly-traded firms pay lower interest rates than non-publicly-traded
firms or individuals.  However, among related borrowers, banks offer worse terms to publicly-traded firms!
Related publicly-traded firms face higher real interest rates and have higher collateral requirements than
related individuals and privately-held firms.  Nonetheless, loans to related parties are still 29.4% less likely
to be bad when made to publicly-traded firms.  Similarly, among related parties, the recovery rate on loans
to publicly-traded firms is 0.52 higher than on loans to individuals and privately-held firms.   In contrast,
borrowing terms and ex-post performance line up much better for unrelated parties.  Among the unrelated
parties, publicly-traded firms pay lower interest rates and post less collateral than individuals and privately-
held firms although the two groups have similar recovery rates.
In summary, among related parties, banks offer better terms to individuals and privately-held firms
than to publicly-traded ones.  However, loans to individuals and privately-held companies are substantially
more risky than loans to publicly-traded firms. Thus, consistent with the looting view, the closeness of the
relationship between the controllers of the bank and the borrower matters for the terms on which related
parties borrow.  These results place constraints on the structure of a successful three-state information model.
Specifically, the version of the information view that fits these data  is one in which non-publicly traded firms
with close ties to the bank are the best performers in the intermediate state of the world and unrelated parties
are the worst performers.  Furthermore, the information view would also need to justify on efficiency grounds
the sharp increase in related lending that takes place once banks are in financial distress. -21- 21
VI.  Conclusion.
Banking crises are common.  There is widespread agreement among economists that the fragility of
the banking system is related to moral hazard problems.  There is less agreement on the precise nature of the
moral hazard problem that makes banks so fragile.  One view is that banking crises result from bad
management.  Another view is that deposit insurance may create incentives for banks to take excessive risk.
Yet another view is that financial crises result from soft budget constraints created by reputational problems.
Here we draw attention to perhaps another source of moral hazard: looting or tunneling.  We show that related
lending is a particularly costly form of moral hazard, and a large feature of banking in Mexico. Looting makes
banks inherently fragile since related parties default on their loans to the bank when the economy fails and
the continuation value of their equity in the bank is low.  Related lending is attractive partly because of
deposit insurance and because of incentives to expropriate minority shareholders.   
Our results shed light on five issues.  First, related lending was a large fraction of the banking
business in Mexico in 1995.  Second, when the economy slipped into a recession, the fraction of related
lending almost doubled for the banks that subsequently went bankrupt and increased only slightly for the
banks that survived.  Third, the borrowing terms offered to related parties were substantially better than those
available to unrelated ones, even after controlling for observable financial characteristics.  Fourth, related
loans had much higher default rates and lower recovery rates than unrelated ones.  Fifth, those who benefitted
the most from related lending were persons and companies closest to the controllers of banks.  In fact, in most
cases, a dollar lent to a related person or a related privately-held company turned out to be a dollar lost.  All
five findings are consistent with the looting view and speak to the relevance of related lending as a source of
bank fragility.
The results in this paper may have profound implications for the regulatory design of banking
institutions.  The Basel rules primarily address the incentives of banks to take excessive risks.  The results
in this paper show the importance of  looting as a key determinant of banking stability.  The best way to
reduce the fragility of financial systems may be to reduce the importance of related lending.  This may be
achieved by explicit regulation of related lending as well as by enhanced reporting requirements, better
investor protection (such as  more scrutiny of self-dealing transactions and directors’ liability in bankruptcy)
and closer supervision. 
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Table I
 The Size of Related Lending






Event period December 1993 Twelve months
before the Event




Panel A:  Bankrupt banks taken over
Cremi 6-1994 0.28 0.25 0.43 5.47 0.47
Union 6-1994 0.17 0.13 0.37 7.05 0.49
Oriente 12-1995 0.15 0.09 0.22 1.42 0.14
Banpais 3-1995 0.21 0.17 0.30 1.67 0.62
Probursa 6-1995 0.05 0.04 0.21 0.59 0.20
Centro 6-1995 0.14 0.20 0.31 1.33 0.36
Inverlat 6-1995 0.22 0.24 0.37 1.17 0.28
Mexicano 12-1996 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.56 0.06
Banoro 1-1997 0.05 0.10 0.13 0.39 0.11
Confia 5-1997 0.15 0.17 0.24 1.35 0.27
Atlantico 12-1997 0.14 0.21 0.26 0.41 0.52
Bancrecer 12-1997 0.14 0.12 0.21 2.72 0.35
Promex 12-1997 0.15 0.19 0.27 0.54 0.29
Serfin 6-1999 0.11 0.18 0.35 0.72 0.26
Mean 0.14 0.15 0.27 1.81 0.32
Median 0.14 0.17 0.27 1.25 0.29
Panel B:  Survivor banks
Bancomer 6-1997 0.10 0.20 0.17 0.46 0.10
Banamex 6-1997 0.16 0.20 0.18 0.31 0.25
Citibank 6-1997 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 0.00
Bital 6-1997 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.71 0.08
Banorte 6-1997 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.19 0.06
Mean 0.10 0.14 0.13 0.42 0.10
Median 0.10 0.15 0.17 0.38 0.08
Panel C: All banks
Mean all banks 0.13 0.15 0.23 1.50 0.26
Median all banks 0.14 0.17 0.22 0.72 0.26
Panel D:  Tests of difference in means (t-stats) and medians (z-stats)
Bankrupt  vs.








a=significant at 1%; b=significant at 5%; c=significant at 10%.  Source: Sam-300 and Senicreb databases.
The table presents summary statistics on the size of related loans in Mexico for several periods. We group banks into two
categories. The first group of thirteen banks (“bankrupt banks”) includes those that were either taken over by the government or acquired
by other banks to avoid a government takeover. The remaining five banks (“survivor banks”) did not experience changes in control during
the sample period. Panel A presents summary statistics for bankrupt banks taken over while Panel B presents summary statistics for
survivor banks. The first 3 columns include data on related loans scaled by total private sector loans, one year before the event period and
at the event period. For the banks in Panel B, we use June 1997 as the event date since they were not intervened by the government and
survived the period.  Panels A and B also include the mean and the median values for bankrupt and survivor banks.  Panel C shows the
mean and median for all the 19 banks.  Finally, Panel D, reports t-statistics and z-statistics (Wilcoxon rank sum) as the test for significance
on the difference in mean and median values between bankrupt and survivor banks. The exact definition of related loans can be found in
the appendix.-26-
Table II
Terms of the loans for the sample of unrelated and related loans







Panel A: Real interest rates
Flexible rate & domestic currency 381 0.0956 264 0.0675 0.0281 5.28
a
0.0987 0.0736 0.0251 7.67
a
Flexible rate & US dollars 185 0.1247 173 0.1022 0.0225 6.44
a
0.1294 0.0981 0.0313 8.59
a
Fixed rate & domestic currency 181 0.0438 123 -0.0250 0.0688 4.83
a
0.0744 -0.0367 0.1111 5.87
a
Fixed rate & US dollars 111 0.1200 119 0.0792 0.0408 6.36
a
0.1197 0.0732 0.0465 6.69
a
Panel B: Interest rate spreads
Flexible rate & domestic currency 381 0.0654 264 0.0344 0.0310 6.42
a
0.0700 0.0400 0.0300 12.36
a
Flexible rate & US dollars 185 0.0687 173 0.0412 0.0275 10.75
a
0.0700 0.0388 0.0312 10.55
a
Fixed rate & domestic currency 181 0.0461 123 -0.0865 0.1326 10.40
a
0.0518 -0.1032 0.1550 9.39
a
Fixed rate & US dollars 111 0.0691 119 0.0217 0.0474 7.67
a
0.0609 0.0145 0.0464 7.77
a
Panel C: Collateral
Collateral dummy 858 0.8380 679 0.5272 0.3108 14.02
a
1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 13.21
a
Collateral value / loan 847 2.8950 671 1.1878 1.7072 10.09
a
1.8399 0.5209 1.3190 14.51
a
Panel D: Guarantees
Personal guarantees dummy 858 0.6632 679 0.4772 0.1860 7.47
a
1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 7.34
a
Panel E:  Maturity
Maturity (months) 858 45.6241 679 48.7284 -3.1043 -1.27
36.0000 36.0000 0.0000 0.98
Panel F: Grace period 
Grace period (months) 858 4.8077 679 12.1845 -7.3768 -10.83
a
0.0000 6.0000 -6.0000 -11.89
a
      a=significant at 1%; b=significant at 5%; c=significant at 10%. 
The table presents raw results for the random sample of unrelated and related loans.  The table presents, for each empirical proxy,
the number of usable observations, the mean, and the median values for unrelated and related loans.  We  report t-statistics and z-statistics
(Wilcoxon rank sum) as the test for significance for the change in mean and median values, respectively.  Definitions for each variable

































































































































































Bank dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of
observations





0.29 0.25 0.20 0.05 0.13 0.02 0.05
Log - likelihood -707.40 -3145.93 -870.20 -7608.91 -3121.96
a=significant at 1%; b=significant at 5%; c=significant at 10%.
The table presents OLS and Probit regressions for the cross-section of loans.  OLS regressions have robust standard errors.  In
the case of the continuous regressors, probit derivatives are calculated based on the average of the scale factor.  In the case of binomial
regressors, probit derivatives are computed as the average of the difference in the cumulative normal distributions evaluated with and
without the dummy variable.  Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. Definitions for each variable can be found in the appendix.-28-
Table IV
Panel A: Loan performance for the sample of unrelated and related loans
Unrelated loans Related loans
N Frequency N Frequency Difference t-stat
Performance of the loans
Loans that defaulted 317 0.3695 451 0.6642 -0.2947 -11.99
a
Other bad loans 15 0.0175 24 0.0353 -0.0178 -2.21
b
All bad loans 332 0.3869 475 0.6996 -0.3127 -12.81
a
Breakup of bad loans by outcome 
Restructured 44 0.1325 59 0.1242 0.0083 0.35
Sold to FOBAPROA 10 0.0301 19 0.0400 -0.0099 -0.74
Sent to court 205 0.6175 256 0.5389 0.0786 2.22
b
Sent to collection department 35 0.1054 72 0.1516 -0.0462 -1.03
Other loan outcomes 38 0.1145 69 0.1453 -0.0308 -1.27
  
 Panel B: Recovery rates for the sample of unrelated and related bad loans







  All bad loans
All bad loans 332 0.4624 475 0.2721 0.1903 7.62
a
0.4475 0.1500 0.2975 6.49
a
All bad loans & no collateral 53 0.4206 204 0.2580 0.1626 3.08
a
0.4299 0.1000 0.3299 2.14
b
All bad loans & collateral<median 95 0.3705 315 0.2694 0.1011 2.52
b
0.1800 0.1200 0.0600 1.56
All loans
All loans
858 0.7920 679 0.4908 0.3012 15.07
a
1.0000 0.4000 0.6000 13.94
a
 a=significant at 1%; b=significant at 5%; c=significant at 10%. 
The table presents data on the incidence and recovery rates of non-performing loans in the random sample of loans. “Other loan
outcomes” include: (1) bad loans that were later fully or partially liquidated without requiring court intervention or internal collection; (2)
loans for which the required reserve was applied and the bank assumed a complete loss; and (3) loans for which negotiations between the
bank and the borrower are still undergoing at the time of writing.  N is the number of loans in each category.  The table reports t-statistics





Independent variables: All bad loans
(Probits)
















































































































Bank dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of loan dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 1307 1470 665 791 1307 1470
Log-likelihood -629.10 -730.70 -523.07 -620.48 -993.69 -1174.78
Adjusted R
2 / Pseudo R
2 0.31 0.28 0.16 0.15 0.23 0.22
    a=significant at 1%; b=significant at 5%; c=significant at 10%.
The table presents probit and tobit regressions of the cross-section of loans.  In the case of the continuous regressors, probit
derivatives are calculated based on the average of the scale factor.  In the case of binomial regressors, probit derivatives are computed as
the average of the difference in the cumulative normal distributions evaluated with and without the dummy variable.  Standard errors are




Interest rates Collateral Default Performance

































































































































































Bank dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of loan dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 1470 1470 1418 1451 1470 1470
Adjusted R
2 / Pseudo R
2 0.30 0.25 0.21 0.05 0.30 0.23
Log - likelihood  -697.08 -3140.80 -708.75 -1152.98
a=significant at 1%; b=significant at 5%; c=significant at 10%.
The table presents OLS, probit and tobit regressions of the cross-section of loans.  OLS regressions have robust standard errors.
In the case of the continuous regressors, probit derivatives are calculated based on the average of the scale factor.  In the case of binomial
regressors, probit derivatives are computed as the average of the difference in the cumulative normal distributions evaluated with and
without the dummy variable. Definitions for each variable can be found in the appendix.-31-
Appendix
Description of the variables
This appendix describes the variables collected for the terms and performance of a random sample of loans made by 17 Mexican
banks circa 1995.  The first column gives the name of the variable and the second column describes it.  Sources: SAM-300 database (largest
300 loans of each bank together with their size and the names of the borrowers behind each of them), SENICREB database (complete list
of loans made by each of the privatized banks), and each bank’s database as reported at the request of the Mexican Banking Commission.
Variable Description
Related loans Article 73 of the Mexican Code of Mercantile Institutions stipulates that a related loan is a loan for which the
borrower is either: (1) a shareholder with 1% or more of the voting rights of the bank; (2) a person who has
family ties—by marriage or blood up to the second degree—with a shareholder of 1% or more of the voting
rights of the bank; (3) a director, officer, or employee of a company or trust fund that holds 1% or more of the
voting rights of the bank or a director, officer, or employee of the bank itself with the power to engage into
contracts or transactions under the name bank; or (4) a person holding 10% or more of the voting rights of a
company that holds 1% or more of the shares in the bank.
Unrelated loan An arms-length loan given to a borrower who is not a shareholder, director, officer, or employee of the bank
nor a relative of any of the previous groups of persons.
Real interest rate The average real interest rate paid during the duration of the loan.  The average real interest rate is computed








+ = ∑ π
rate and  the inflation rate.  For loans in Mexican pesos the inflation rate was calculated using the Producer
Price Index (INPP) excluding oil products.  For loans in US dollars and other foreign currencies the inflation
rate was calculated using the US Producer Price Index (PPI) of finished products.
Interest rate spread The average interest rate spread of the loan above the benchmark risk-free security rate.  The average interest
rate spread is computed as:  , where r








in the contract between the bank and the borrower above the loan reference rate i. For loans in Mexican pesos
the risk-free security is the 28-day Treasury bills (CETES) rate. For loans in US dollars and other foreign
currencies, the risk-free security rate is the 1-month LIBOR rate.
Collateral dummy Dummy that takes a value equal to 1 if the loan is backed up by collateral; the variable is 0 otherwise.
Definitions for collateral include physical tangible assets, financial documents (e.g., title documents, securities,
etc.), intangibles, and business proceeds pledged by the borrower to ensure repayment on his loan.  Collateral
does not include personal guarantees such as obligations backed only by the signature of the borrower or the
submission of wealth statements from guarantors to the bank—a standard practice in Mexico.
Collateral value / loan The ratio of collateral value to loan when the loan was first granted. 
Personal guarantees
dummy
Dummy that takes a value equal to 1 if the loan is secured by a personal guarantee; the variable takes a value
equal to 0 otherwise.  A personal guarantee is defined as the obligation to repayment by a letter of compromise.
Usually, the debtor must submit wealth statements from a guarantor who is willing to backs his loan.
Maturity The number of months to maturity of the loan starting from the moment in which the loan is given.  Maturity
varies according to debtor characteristics, loan type, and terms established in the loan contract..
Grace period The number of months beyond maturity given to a debtor in order for her to repay her due balance with the
bank.  A grace period is granted to a debtor on an individual basis.  A loan may have no grace period at all but,
if granted, the grace period may vary according to the loan type and terms established in the loan contract.
Related dummy Dummy that takes value of 1 if the loan is related; the variable is 0 otherwise.Variable Description
-32-
Log of assets The natural logarithm of total assets in millions of US dollars deflated to December 1995.  Total assets are
equal to the total value of current assets, long term receivables, investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, other
investments, net property plant and equipment and other assets.  Total assets figures are from 1989-1998 (the
first available) and are deflated to December 1995 using Mexico’s Producer Price Index and then converted
to US dollars using the average 1995 exchange rate.
Total debt/total assets The ratio of total debt to total assets.  Total debt is equal to the sum of all interest bearing obligations of the
debtor plus all other liabilities.  Total assets is equal to the total value of current assets, long term receivables,
investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant and equipment and other
assets.  Total debt and total assets figures are from 1989-1998 (the first pair available) in millions of Mexican
pesos that were deflated to December 1995 using Mexico’s Producer Price Index and then converted to US
dollars using the average 1995 exchange rate.
Domestic currency
dummy
Dummy variable that takes a value equal to 1 if the currency is domestic, that is, Mexican pesos or the
inflation-adjusted currency units UDIs (Unidad de Inversión); the variable takes a value equal to 0 otherwise.
Fixed interest-rate
dummy
Dummy variable that takes a value equal to 1 if the loan pays a fixed interest rate; the variable takes a value
equal to 0 otherwise.  A fixed interest rate loan pays an annual percentage rate on a fixed basis without being
updated during the duration of the loan.
Individual dummy Dummy variable that takes a value equal to 1 if the debtor is an individual—not a firm; the variable takes a
value equal to 0 otherwise.
Bank dummies Seventeen bank-fixed effects dummy variables. 
Loan year dummies Six fixed-year effect dummy variables.  We generated a year of origination dummy variable for the years of
1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996.  The year of loan dummy takes a value equal to 1if the loan
was originated in that year; the variable takes a value equal to 0 otherwise.  The year of origination of the loan
is the year when the loan was contracted and granted.
Industry dummies Twelve industry dummy variables.  We classified every debtor in one of 12 broad sectors of the economy.  The
following are the industries captured: (1) agriculture, fishery, and forestry; (2) mining; (3) manufacture of food,
beverages, and tobacco; (4) construction; (5) electricity, gas, and water; (6) commerce, hotels, and restaurants;
(7) transportation; (8) financial services; (9) community services; (10) civil and mercantile associations; (11)
government, defense, public security; and (12) foreign and international organizations.
Loans that defaulted Loan that has stopped payment on principal and interest and has defaulted on the original terms of the
borrower’s loan agreement, as of the moment we drew the sample of random loans.  In Mexico, the general
rule for the classification of a loan as non-performing is after 90 days of missing a payment, or in the case of
a one-payment loan, after 30 days of missing the payment.
Other bad loans Loans that were not non-performing but still were sent to Fobaproa or had a recovery rate of less than 100%.
All bad loans Sum of other bad loans and non-performing loans.  Total bad loans are the loans that: (1) were non-performing;
or (2) were sold to Fobaproa; or (3) had recovery rates of less than 100%.
Restructured loans Loan for which the original terms have been altered due to the deterioration of the debtor’s financial condition.
A restructure is generally undertaken in order to avoid complete default or uncollectibility from the debtor.
In most cases, a restructure involves the extension of the maturity of the loan, a change of the interest rate
terms, and/or the rescheduling of interest payments.
Loans sold to
FOBAPROA
Non-performing loan sold to the deposit insurance agency Fobaproa (Fondo de Protección al Ahorro Bancario).
Loans sent to court Non-performing loan for which the bank initiated a judicial proceeding (generally civil lawsuit) against the
debtor in a Mexican court of law in order to recover the debtor’s due balance with the bank, either by taking




Non-performing loan for which the bank filed an internal payment collection procedure.  The procedure works
on a borrower-by-borrower basis and is intended to make the borrower resume payments on her defaulted loan,
either by negotiating a restructure, a forgiveness of her debt, or both.  This is procedure functions as a warning
for the borrower with due payments and is less stringent than a court procedure.  Generally, if administrative
collection fails the bank will then file a lawsuit against the debtor in a Mexican court of law.
Other loan outcomes Other loan outcomes include: (1) bad loans that were later fully or partially liquidated without requiring court
or internal collection; (2) loans for which required reserve was applied and the bank assumed a complete loss;
and (3) loans for which negotiations between the bank and the borrower are still undergoing.
Log of sales The natural logarithm of sales in millions of US dollars deflated to December 1995.  Sales are equal to the total
value of products and services sold, nationally and internationally, minus sales returns and discounts.  Sales
figures are from 1989-1998 (the first available) and are deflated to December 1995 using Mexico’s Producer
Price Index and then converted to US dollars using the average 1995 exchange rate.
Net income / sales The ratio of net income to sales. Net income is equal to operating income minus interest expenses and net taxes
paid, as well as the cost of any extraordinary items.  Sales are equal to the total value of products and services
sold, nationally and internationally, minus sales returns and discounts.  Net income and sales figures are from
1989-1998 (the first pair available) in millions of Mexican pesos that were deflated to December 1995 using
Mexico’s Producer Price Index and then converted to US dollars using the average 1995 exchange rate.
Publicly traded Dummy variable that takes a value equal to 1 if the borrowing company was listed and publicly traded in the
Mexican Stock Exchange during the year of 1995; the variable takes a value equal to 0 otherwise.
Publicly traded and
related
Dummy variable that takes a value equal to 1 if the borrowing company was both publicly traded and related;
the variable takes a value equal to 0 otherwise.